and misunderstood. One major misinterpretation that stems from this lack of research is that housebuilding is an underdeveloped industry, especially when compared with manufacturing. Many assumed that housebuilding should be an industry of large and presumably more efficient firms. The purpose of this paper is to address this gap in research on the housebuilding industry by examining its firm size structure in the Province of Ontario, Canada, from 1978 through 1998 This is done by synthesising the literature on firm size structure in housebuilding and extending it with a case study of Ontario from 1978 through 1998. The Ontario case, broadly typical of North America, joins a small but growing body of literature which shows that housebuilding has not experienced a long-run trend of rising industry concentration, in spite of observers' hopes and predictions. Large, oligopolistic firms remain absent in housebuilding. This leads to questions about why the industry is`unable' to produce dominant superbuilders, and why the small firm in particular continues to survive. To suggest some possible answers, this paper places housebuilding in the context of recent research on industrial organisation and restructuring, to suggest how this industry may benefit from, and throw new light on, social systems of production.
Industrial firm size structure Trends and perspectives
The structure of any industry can be described in terms of its firm size structure, product differentiation, firm entry barriers, and industrial growth. Firm size structure is usually a starting point, serving to outline the contours of an industry from which the other issues take shape. Following Berle and Means (1932) , scholars became increasingly aware of the rise of industrial concentration, particularly its historical significance and market implications. For many observers, the postwar decades confirmed that concentration had become a defining feature of industrial capitalism. In the United States and United Kingdom, the largest industrials continued to gain market share such that`national champion' firms would dominate national and international markets. In Canada, concentration rose up to 1970, indeed to levels higher than those in most other industrialised countries, including the USA (Green, 1990; Khemani, 1980) . There arose a language to describe industrial concentration and its attendant oligopoly firms: a`dual economy' of`centre' and`periphery' firms (Averitt, 1968) ; à technostructure', or`planning system' to replace the`market system' of many competitive economic agents (Galbraith, 1967) . Within industrial geography, Taylor and Thrift (1983) offered a program for research based on the interindustry and intraindustrỳ segmentation' of business organisations according to their size. Although this research acknowledged the limits to such generalisation, primarily through historical specificity, many observers had by mid-century begun to sing the chorus of large-firm dominance and concentration within industries and national economies. Perhaps the most influential statement of this process is Chandler's The Visible Hand, in which he tells the story of the advent of large-firm dominance in the United States from 1840 to 1920. He writes:`I n many sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced what Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces ... . As modern business enterprise acquired functions hitherto carried out by the market, it became the most powerful institution in the American economy and its managers the most influential group of economic decision makers. The rise of modern business enterprise in the United States, therefore, brought with it managerial capitalism'' (1977, page 1).
(1) By firm size structure, I refer both to the distribution of firms based on their size, or firm size distribution, and to the relative distribution of output among firms, or market share.
In the context of rising concentration after World War 2, the works of Chandler and others provided valuable insights into the origins and implications of large-firm dominance in selected industries. But industrial concentration has not been the experience of every country or industry. Canada soon became an anomaly, as aggregate concentration diminished after the 1970s and was no greater in the 1990s than in the 1920s and 1930s (Green, 1990) . Germany and Japan, while not lacking major multinationals, have been more supportive of smaller firms than have the United States and the United Kingdom (Hayter, 1997) . Within national economies, the activities usually associated with highest concentration are primary industries, manufacturing, and finance. In the USA, for example, the addition of foreign auto assemblers after 1970 has not altered the`tight' market where the leading four firms account for over 90% of all output (Holmes, 1997) . This is commonly expressed as a concentration ratio of the leading four firms, or CR 4 . (2) In most industries, a measure of the leading concerns hides numerous others beneath them which can comprise a greater proportion of total industrial output. Common industries for such deconcentrated firm size structure are dairying, sawmills and paper mills, and residential construction. These are typically atomistic rather than oligopolistic, with a CR 4 of less than 25% (see figure 1). Between these polar opposites lie a host of industries to produce a gradual transition from deconcentration to oligopoly or even monopoly markets. In Canada, mining and manufacturing have produced the largest corporations (Ray, 1996) , but`tight' markets (2) A typical measure of industrial concentration. This and other measures are used in this study. See figure 1, and Curry and George (1983) for an overview of measures of industrial concentration. The CR4 (concentration ratio) is the proportion of total output in a specific industry produced by the largest four firms. The IR80 (inverse ratio) indicates the minimum number of firms in a specific industry required to produce 80% of all output. Industry examples are primarily Canadian, though the same breakdown would apply elsewhere (see Green, 1990 , chapter 4). Firm size structure in North American housebuildingand corporate dominance are not the rule: Canadian manufacturing industries, for example, display the full range of CRs depicted in figure 1. Thus, even if national and international markets have become more concentrated, firm size distributions still vary quite widely between countries and industries. Despite the continued presence of diverse firm size distributions, we are more familiar with the contours of concentrated industries and the maintenance of their leaders. A host of factors may influence firm growth, and thus the distribution of firm sizes within an industry, including mergers, as noted above, and internal firm growth based on such things as technological innovativeness and good fortune. The relative influence of each varies, but given the interplay of these influences, firm size distributions tend to show a regularity in skewness such that the competitive process seems to favour large firms: in general, growth rates stabilise with increasing firm size, which results in their greater long-run expansion. Expansion in turn breeds firm persistence which, like size, brings greater long-term growth. The cycle is thus repeated and the net effect is that the range of firm sizes widens, usually over long periods of time, and leaders rarely relinquish their dominance (Scherer and Ross, 1990) . Up to 1982, the US Census Bureau collected data on large-firm persistence in manufacturing. These show that large industrials have proven quite stable over long periods of time (table 1) . More than half of the fifty largest manufacturing companies in 1982 had been in the top fifty twenty years earlier. Almost two fifths had ranked in the top fifty thirtyfive years earlier. Small firms can occasionally penetrate the top ranks by internal growth, though their growth rates tend to be too variable for sustained gains in market share. For example, in Canadian manufacturing in the 1970s, firm sizes experienced à regression to the mean', whereby large and small firms alike moved closer to their industry averages owing to faster growth among small firms (Baldwin, 1998) . But, as in concentrated industries, small firms could not challenge for the industry top ranks, even though their growth rates were higher entering the 1980s (Ray, 1996) .
Although scholars continue to show a strong interest in concentrated industries and their leaders (Dicken, 1998; Roy, 1997) , historical and contemporary research has made some headway in showing that large firms are not necessarily the destination of industrial development. Though this point is sometimes overlooked, Chandler (1977; recognised it in his own work, in which he distinguishes between`traditional' and modern' industries. Traditional industries remained labour intensive, unable to tap into growing mass markets as modern industries could by using new energy sources, implementing continuous-process production methods for scale and scope economies, and organising the administrative coordination necessary for centralisation. But the distinction between traditional and modern implies a one-way path of progress. Industries may take on quite different forms, even in the same places, as firms can move toward and away from scale and integration through time. The supposed`traditional' do not necessarily represent an end state of development (Gertler, 1988; Hiebert, 1990; Lewis, 1994) . Scranton (1983, page 3) makes the argument in his research on 19th-century textile mills in Philadelphia, which contrast sharply with the well-known textile giants at Lowell:`F or historians who sought to trace the evolution of corporate America, the Philadelphia experience in textiles has been of little significance. But for those who would undertake to establish how capitalist industry functioned in the nineteenth-century context, who see some value in the reconstruction of industrial development as a moving totality, the documentation of a mature`small business' alternative to industrial gigantism will add a missing dimension to American economic history.'' From this, he argues that firms must continually confront an`accumulation matrix' ö varying social and economic forces which give rise to alternative forms of industrial organisation at a point in time. Research on industrial restructuring since the early 1970s has followed the same logic (Gertler, 1996) . Some writers have argued that new market conditions, in contrast to stability and growth during the golden years, have exposed the rigidity of large-scale operations (Piore and Sabel, 1984) . Market segmentation and product ephemerality in particular have left large industrials with slow changing overcapacity. For example, we have learned how North American auto assemblers have had to restructure their operations to meet this new competition (Womack et al, 1990) . Technological change has gone part way in solving this problem, as firms could control their inventories and redeploy their productive capacity to meet quickly changing niche markets. Yet some argue that these technologies also level the playing field for large and small firms alike. This rediscovery of the small firm has largely come by way of research on selected industrial districts, in which industrial production systems are composed of clustered and linked firms. Here, as elsewhere, the role of small firms is debated (Harrison, 1997) , but there appears to be general agreement that they are important features of industrial production systems.
If this body of work has presented an opportunity for a reexamination of the housebuilding industry öone not based on the uncritical acceptance of scale and integration as optimalölittle empirical research has actually been carried out. Most of the major North American works were published before 1975 (Colean, 1944; Grebler, 1950; Maisel, 1953 ) and endorse, implicitly or explicitly, large firms and mass production methods. Recent work has simply been unempirical (Eichler, 1982) . In Canada a recent attempt to analyse the industry had to rely on the dearth of secondary sources, and wound up perpetuating century-old misconceptions (CMHC, 1989) . Even when industrial development has been considered, the argument has been that housebuilding was not left behind by progress because it in fact displays many of the features of mass production; housebuilding, in other words, measures up only because it conforms to the supposed singular, linear path of progress (Schlesinger and Erlich, 1986) . Housebuilding has long been inappropriately criticised for its many small firms, the`underdeveloped' building methods they sustain, and ultimately the high price of housing that results. Criticism and proposals for change strengthened after World War 2 when scale economies and integration brought further gains in manufacturing. Urban economic growth presented the opportunity: if growing mass markets could support such development in manufacturing, why could it not do the same in housebuilding? After all, the state would be at least as supportive here too (Bacher, 1993; Checkoway, 1980) . Still, broad-sweeping generalisations of inefficiency persisted. By the late 1960s, when research on housebuilding slowed in North America, land development and urban form became the foci of housing and urban studies. In one respect, this emphasis is understandable because land is a major input in the supply of housing and developers, though sometimes confused with speculators, are central to urban expansion. Now, when questions of urban growth are considered, housebuildersöone of the primary agents involvedöare conspicuous by their absence (Feagin and Parker, 1990) .
Research abroad, in Britain and Australia, has progressed further. Scholars such as Ball (1988) in the British context have argued that, to understand builders, we must appreciate that they are but one of several`local structures of housing provision'. Local circumstances can have various influences over the new housing market, including its firm size structure. Thus, like Scranton, some observers recognise that there is no optimal firm size and that size does not necessarily represent full industrial development. So the first step to a fuller understanding of housebuilding is to draw together the literature which says something about its firm size structure, from which we can assess how this industry can benefit from, and contribute to, research on industrial organisation. North American housebuilding contrasts sharply with concentrated industries, though to date, evidence of this is lacking. The remainder of this paper brings together the literature on the firm size structure of the industry, and builds on that with an empirical study of housebuilding in Ontario.
Trends in North American housebuilding
Research on the housebuilding industry has rarely made use of standard measures of firm size structure such as the CR and IR. Usually, firms and output are categorised into size classes based on numbers of housing units, from which concentration may be inferred. Internationally, the industry varies considerably in its degree of concentration. In Europe, for example, housebuilding is more concentrated than is typical in North America, though still much less so than in other industries. In Britain in 1976, only 0.9% of firms produced more than 250 units each, yet they produced 38% of all new housing output (Ball, 1988) . However, more than one third of all units were produced by builders of no more than 50 dwellings. These statistics would combine to produce a`low' IR, as depicted in figure 1 , and large builders alone would surely produce a`low' CR. Employment figures indicate that the British construction industry as a whole became less concentrated into the 1980s, though housebuilding itself rose in concentration into the 1990s (Ball, 1988, page 117; Nicol and Hooper, 1999) . Housebuilding in Britain and Europe is more concentrated than in North America because of the use of more capital-intensive building methods, requiring large-firm resources, and the greater reliance on large-scale state contracts. This explains why, in places such as Australia, housebuilding is more like that in North America, where smaller firms are better represented. But British housebuilding is still far less concentrated than attention-grabbing oligopolistic manufacturing activities.
North American housebuilding is even less concentrated. The US housebuilding industry entered the postwar period much as it had left off in the 1930s; builders of fewer than 25 units per year dominated, both in numbers and in market share (Colean, 1944; Colean and Newcomb, 1952) . The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 1954) conducted several surveys of the housebuilding industry, each confirming this persistent firm size structure: in 1949, for example, 90% of all commercial builders started fewer than 10 units; 42% just 1 (table 2) . In contrast, large builders of more than 100 units each contributed about the same output ö roughly one third of all unitsö but made up only 1% of all builders. Based on a sample of firms belonging to the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) in the following decades, it appears that the US housebuilding industry continued in this pattern for the next two decades. (3) The large builder group would make gains in market share over the 1950s though there remained enough of them so that output was very decentralised. In northern California, for example, large-scale builders of more than 100 units a year (which included land developers) raised their market share from 32% to 74% of all output by 1960, but this group numbered 89 firms. Even at the scale of California, this decade could not raise housebuilding out of`low' CR 4 concentration. And the 1960s seemed to reverse the upward trend (table 2): small builders produced 22% of all units by 1969; the market share of large builders was reduced to 43%. Moreover, median firm size fell and smaller builders made up a greater share of all companies over the ten years; 58% to 70%. In terms of firm size, NAHB builders have maintained this distribution since the 1970s. Estimates based on their size distribution suggest that market share has continued to be overrepresented amongst large builders, yet small and medium-sized firms still make up a (3) As of 1959, the data in table 2 are a sample of builders belonging to the NAHB, in contrast to the census taken by the BLS for 1949. Membership in the NAHB is not mandatory, and would undercount the number of small builders in the country. This would have the effect of raising the concentration represented in their data relative to the national average. Despite this, NAHB builders were still very deconcentrated (see Willis, 1979 , pages 60^64). large share of all output, especially because they are undercounted by recent industry data for the USA. (4) Relative to other industries, the Canadian housebuilding industry seems to have shared the same deconcentration as in the USA, though small builders have been more prominent in Canada (table 3) . Based on a sample of builders financed directly under the National Housing Act (NHA), 78% of all builders constructed fewer than 25 dwellings each in 1955. (5) In that year, large builders obtained their greatest share of Table 3 . Firm size distribution (%) and market share in the housebuilding industry, Canada, 1955^86 [sources: for 1955 , CMHC, 1955 1960^73, CMHC, Canadian Housing Statistics, various years; 1983 and 1986 (4) Unfortunately, these can only be estimates. The NAHB, the BLS, and the Census Bureau do not collect data on the market share distribution of builders. Data from the Ontario New Home Warranty Program (ONHWP) and NAHB membership, categorised by size classes, is used to estimate the distribution of market share in table 2. This is done by taking the total number of NAHB firms in each size class in the given years, multiplying that number by the average builder size in each size class in the ONHWP data, and comparing that output with the US total in the 1977 census year. Because the NAHB collected its data in 1976 and the ONHWP data began in 1978, these can only be compared with output in the census year of 1977. This method approximates the NAHB's`builder penetration rate'öthe proportion of all US firms estimated to belong to the NAHB, 70^80% in the late 1990s. The output calculated roughly corresponds to the NAHB's penetration rate, and does not return firm size distributions and market shares significantly different from previous years. A reliance on the ONHWP data for average builder size is the best solution available in the absence of data and is unlikely to underestimate concentration because the largest builders in Canada are located in this province. Still, for the period since 1976, the firm size structure of housebuilding in the USA is only tentatively represented in these data, and reflects the paucity of information sources for this industry.
As Stanley Duobinis, economist at the NAHB, put it in a personal communication on 8 May 2000:`T he problem is who would collect this kind of information besides us?'' (5) On average, NHA builders represent 15% of all residential construction in Canada during this period (see Spurr, 1976 , pages 186^187).
all firms, at 5%. As in the USA, large builders did have a market share advantage, though nowhere near the high concentration levels. Into the 1970s, their market share rose above 40%, but again, amidst a large number of firms; 79 in total. Some of this concentration came as housebuilding and land development were combined in the operations of many companies, but these two activities became distinct as quickly as they merged in the 1950s. Into the 1970s, as often happens in Canada^US trade and investment, activity moved across the border rather than within Canada, as the largest builder^developers turned their attention to lucrative sunbelt construction. Some sought alternative product markets, turning to shopping centres and institutional construction (CMHC, 1989; Lorimer, 1978) . The net effect is that many of these large corporations left the`bricks and mortar' work of constructing houses in Canada to the housebuilders. As shown in table 3, data for 1983^86 show that the share of large builders, less than 2% of all firms, had dropped to an average of 29% of all output. Large builders remained overrepresented in output, but concentration, always`low', returned to levels of the mid-1960s after an intervening period of moderately higher levels. Unlike the USA, national-scale data in Canada are not available after 1986.
A comparison between the national and provincial scales is possible, though again, existing studies are few and data not always comparable. In 1960, there was little variation between the provinces and Canada in the size distribution of builders, but market share was much more variable (table 4). In the Maritimes and British Columbia, large builders were nonexistent and small builders dominated. Market share was distributed accordingly in these areas. In the rest of Canada, large builders were much more visible, especially in Ontario where they peaked at 21% market share. By 1973 concentration had generally risen, and national variations remained, but they became less pronounced. Small builders never made up less than 80% of all firms; large builders never more than 5%. Ontario remained the most concentrated, but again, nothing approaching clear-cut market dominance. Using national census data on the value of construction work, and data shown in tables 3 and 4, Carroll's (1988) research on Ontario shows that the provincial experience was broadly similar to that of Canada from 1978 to 1984: large builders, on average 1% of all firms, contributed 29% of all Firm size structure in North American housebuildingcompletions; much the same as the provincial and national experiences in the early 1960s. From these comparisons, it appears that both Ontario and Canada saw rising concentration in housebuilding into the 1970s, followed by a reversal into the 1980s. Although the contours of housebuilding at national and provincial scales can be gleaned from these sources, the paucity of data makes it difficult to understand the dynamics of change in firm size structure, even for the largest and most identifiable builders. Unlike manufacturing, mergers and acquisitions have not been as important in shaping the industry through time. In comparing mergers by large-scale builders with industrial conglomeration in the 1960s, Grebler (1973, pages 7^9) wrote:``it does not appear to be an impressive trend ...[except] because builders and real estate developers previously were beyond the pale of merger or acquisition candidates.'' Instead of mergers, firm size changes reposition firms and redistribute market share, though with no long-term effect of increasing concentration. Some have speculated that industries serving established and stable product markets, or using unchanging and especially low-technology production methods, offer little opportunity for relative firm growth. In theory, this appears to apply to housebuilding, but evidence is lacking. Within housebuilding research, observers have long understood the factors that act against market centralisation, including the nature of the product, the cyclicality of the market, and the conditions of production. The advantages of scale economies, in particular, cannot be realised if demand swings widely in relation to seasons and business cycles, if it is not renewed often enough because of a long-lasting product, and if the market is geographically limited to local demand. Added to this is the`contestability' of the market, whereby firms can easily enter the industry when existing builders öthose presumably better able to grow and dominateöare realising`surplus profits'. Subcontracting relieves new entrants of the need for building know-how, making financing the principal barrier. But financing itself is limited to short-term cash flow for portions of a project at a time, and by favourable`terms' that builders may negotiate with suppliers. Barriers to entry are therefore small, especially compared with the production factors needed in other sorts of industries. Perhaps only e-commerce start-ups have an easier time entering their industry. In the end, these factors can result in too much variability, or at least uncertainty, for aspiring large firms in housebuilding compared with other industries.
Again, because of the lack of evidence, these can only be speculations, but some have shown how variable even large builders' output can be. In northern California during the 1950s, for example, large-scale builders displayed a range of movement uncommon in manufacturing, some expanding and contracting by more than 10% from year to year (Herzog, 1963 , page 11). Carroll (1988 describes the same situation in Ontario: between 1978 and 1984, the majority of builders moved along the entire firm size distribution. Indeed, some of the largest builders in 1978 moved into thè small' category by 1984. Large builders' output appears to vary too much for sustained growth and dominance. Thus, size changes reposition builders and redistribute market share, but expansion and contraction at all sizes appear to maintain stable deconcentration rather than to centralise output among a select few builders.
Prior research on housebuilding speaks as much to the industry's deconcentration as it does to the need for more work. The contours of housebuilding can be pieced together from different sources which use different methods. Our knowledge of the dynamics of change is less developed, largely because of the lack of appropriate data. Carroll's (1988; research represents one of the few studies which trace these sorts of changes in housebuilding, and is the only work at the provincial scale in Canada. Her study in fact used a subset of the data used in the present study, covering the period 1978^84. The data in this study therefore build on, and extend, prior research on housebuilding.
Data and methods

Data
Data for Ontario builders were obtained from the Ontario New Home Warranty Program (ONHWP). The ONHWP was legislated into existence by the Province of Ontario in 1976, and required that all new housing units and their builders be registered with the program. It is run by the building industry and is financed by mandatory fees collected from builders. The initial push for the program came from the industry as builders sought to allay consumers' concerns for the quality of their products. The program enforces building standards, offers consumer protection, and, as part of these tasks, collects data on the industry. These annual data provide information on firms building housing in Ontario from 1978 through 1998. Those employed in this study pertain to single-detached and semidetached houses, row houses, and low-rise condominium tenure houses built for sale. (6) Firms are defined as vendors that build houses for the purpose of sale, whether speculative or custom contract work, to another party. Individuals building homes for themselves, acting as their own general contractor, are not defined as vendors and are not required to register with the ONHWP. However, individuals who do not initially register with the program, but who build and subsequently sell a new home, are traced by the ONHWP and included as vendors. This is done through an investigative team employed at the ONHWP (currently nine investigators) that traces building permits issued by municipal building departments. The data therefore exclude owner-builders: this is an important point because many firms build one house a year and should not be mistaken for owner-builders. The data are a complete census of all firms constructing low-rise single-family housing in Ontario from 1978 through 1998. The number of firms active in each year ranged from 1885 in 1983 to 4486 in 1986. A total of 19 671 different firms were active in Ontario at some time during the study period.
For the purposes of the present analysis, the data were used initially to build on the works reviewed above by outlining the overall structure of the housebuilding industry in Ontario. Builders and their units are the primary concern, though the data include more detailed information as well. Also included are the locations of builders and their projects. The home municipality of each builder is provided, as is the municipality and postal code of each of their projects. And although the present analysis uses the data at specific time intervals, the data are an annual census of all builders and house completions. (7) The method of data collection and maintenance by the ONHWP raises a number of issues. One problem with the data is that firms are identified by registration numbers, which refer to construction projects, ranging from single houses to subdivisions, rather than to the firms themselves. Because firms can build in two or more locations in a year, a builder may register more than one identification number. Moreover, each one might appear as a separate corporate entity. Indeed, this was common. The ONHWP rectifies this potential problem by aggregating known corporate entities together as a single firm. This is done by use of corporate and/or proprietor information, which the program regularly maintains as part of its role in enforcing industry standards. And because multiple construction sites and corporate entities tend to be the purview of large firms, this makes their task of aggregating (6) High-rise condominium builders and units are excluded from the database primarily because this housing type is not land extensive, and therefore not a major contributor to the production of urban space. (7) These additional features of the data are being used in related research on the expansion and contraction of housebuilding through business cycles, and on the geographical mobility of builders. seemingly separate companies together simpler because these builders are easily identifiable in corporate/proprietor information. The net effect is that the number of builders is accurate, save for a few construction sites run by large builders.
A second problem relates to the inability to identify mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures. As with registration numbers, such activity would tend to be the preserve of larger builders. It can be overlooked because`combines' are not systematically traced by the ONHWP. In terms of firm numbers, and industry-concentration levels, the impact is probably minimal, as I indicate in the next section. With only minor qualifications, ONHWP data may be treated as a complete and reliable census of housebuilders in Ontario from 1978 through 1998.
Methods
Firms and industries are defined by the product markets they serve. This raises a number of issues relating to the study of industrial structure. Given our focus oǹ bricks and mortar' housebuilders, the first issue concerns the measure used to describe industrial structure. The most common measures used are employment, value of sales, and production volume. The latter is considered to be the best indicator of size because of alternative employment and organisational practices, and because of changes in the value of commodities through inflation (Curry and George, 1983) . Construction firms in general, and in housebuilding in particular, are subject to misrepresentation if the appropriate measure is not used: connected with fluctuating mortgage markets and interest rates, and cyclical, the ebb and flow of the housing market can grossly misrepresent a firms' output at any given time. Moreover, a firm that produces a single large estate home in one year may be measured on a par with another that produces a much larger number of row-housing units. In both instances, relative company size is not adequately captured. In terms of employment, construction is marked by heavy use of subcontracting, allowing measures on this basis to underrepresent how large a company may be. For these reasons, production volume has been used in most research on housebuilding and is used in the present study.
This leads to a consideration of how to characterise the industry's firm size distribution, and therefore how to characterise housebuilders based on their output volume. Given that these data are a complete census of all firms, the first step was to examine the firm size distribution to determine whether there was any tendency for firms to cluster along the size distribution. No clustering was found: the distribution is consistently positively skewed and unimodal, centred around the smallest builders. The next step was to check for clustering by dividing the distribution of builders into intervals of five annual completions, such as 1^5 , 6^10, and so on up to 150. Here, too, no clustering was found. As with previous research, the main method for characterising the firm size distribution was to use size classifications. Carroll's (1988; size classes are favoured for several reasons: she chose to build on size classifications used in other studies, but refined them to reflect operational differences between builders of different sizes. Carroll determined these breaks by conducting focus groups and interviews with builders to ask what they believed to be important differences in company sizes. Builders told her that her initial size classes were too coarse to capture important differences in operating procedures. Though her initial size classes are not specified, she indicates that her size classes did not distinguish medium-sized builders well enough, based on their differences in strategies, organisation, and operations, relative both to small and to large builders. Her final size classes have been adopted here, with one change: rather than using classes of``3 units' and`4^10 units', I have divided builders of 1^10 units into two groups, one-house builders, and 2^10. (8) This has the effect of separating out the smallest, one-house builders which make up one third of all builders and over 3% of all output (1048 firms and units), on average. Finally, to build on prior studies, I combine these size classes with measures of concentration discussed earlier (figure 1), to present a fuller picture of housebuilding in Ontario. The warranty program data have been assembled in a fashion that is directly comparable with prior research, except where the data permit the introduction of relevant refinements.
Finally, because the products of housebuilding are perhaps what most distinguish this industry, in terms of heterogeneity, longevity, and spatial fixity, the nature of housing should be acknowledged for its effect on industrial structure. Spatial fixity in particular requires that productive capacity move across space, in place of the movement of final products as in other industries. Because of this, the spatial extent of the housing market, and thereby the range of builders' operations, can be constrained, introducing a geographical limit to firm size. For this reason, an examination of aggregate housebuilding trends at the provincial scale, although mainly an urban activity, cannot be taken to represent the structure of the industry in any one locale. (9) Housebuilding in Ontario, 1978^98 Ontario's housebuilding industry continues to be numerically dominated by the small builder, but shows the market share bias toward larger firms. In this respect, the data permit us a window on the largest builders, those most likely to produce long-run concentration. Unlike their manufacturing counterparts, they are far too unstable to produce any such trend. In terms of firm size structure, small firms and deconcentration remain the theme.
As shown earlier, Ontario's housebuilding industry displayed a similar structure to that of Canada and the USA up to the 1970s. In that decade, large housebuilders became more prominent in Ontario than in Canada as a whole, though concentration remained low at both scales. By the mid-1980s, Ontario had come to reflect the Canadian average more closely again. In broad outline, the firm size structure of housebuilding in Ontario, and perhaps in Canada, appears to have passed through a cycle, not a trend, wherein concentration rose and then fell again. Up to 1998, the industry continued to be the preserve of small firms, when over 85% of all builders constructed no more than 25 units each (table 5, over). Even within size classes, the tendency is for builders to cluster at the lower end of the range: roughly one third of small builders construct just one house a year; most medium-sized builders are found at the lower end of the 26^100 range; and most large builders construct fewer than 200 units. The distribution of builder sizes in Ontario has thus returned to its shape in 1960, prior to the rise in concentration in the province.
(8) Carroll eliminated one-house builders from her sample of ONHWP data to avoid counting personal-builders' in the commercial construction industry. This resulted in her use of``3 units' as a size class. In my census of builders, owner-builders were filtered out, as mentioned, making one-house builders`vendors', or commercial builders, of new homes for another party. Thus, the size classes used are: small builders, 1, 2^10, 11^25; medium, 26^50, 51^100, 101^200; large, b 200 houses per year. Note that in much earlier work on housebuilding,`large builders' are defined as those constructing more than 100 houses per year, whereas Carroll and I class these as medium', and`large' as more than 200. For comparison with earlier studies, I present both classifications in the subsequent empirical section. (9) Khemani (1980) makes this same point in his review of Canadian industrial organisation after World War 2. As noted earlier, this is the subject of further research with the ONHWP data [see footnote (7)].
As in earlier years, market share was not as skewed among firm size classes but was roughly evenly distributed in Ontario (table 5) . By 1988, large builders appear to have gained an edge, but their share had also dropped by 1998 when medium-sized builders picked up the slack. The contrast from firm size distribution is even sharper if the classes are subdivided. One-house builders are reduced to less than 3% of all output, in contrast to being one third of all firms. Among medium-sized builders, too, output is more concentrated among the bigger firms of the class. Large builders began the study period in the same manner, though the rebalancing of total output in favour of medium builders has affected the largest builders the most. Thus, if builders tend to be small, output tends to be concentrated among larger builders. These opposing patterns of firm sizes and market share do not, however, translate into higher market concentration. Ontario's housebuilding industry sustains builders of all sizes. And although small builders are underrepresented in output, when combined, they continue to make up a large share of all output. As a result, industrial concentration remains very low (table 5) . It was highest in 1978, when the CR 4 was only 9.8% of all output, and the IR 80 required 647 builders. The CR 4 dropped at each ten-year interval, marking further deconcentration. The IR 80 rose by 1988 as the number of firms required for 80% of output increased, but it had fallen again by 1998 because of gains made by medium-sized builders. Thus, not only has Ontario's housebuilding industry not experienced rising concentration, it actually diminished in 1998 to its levels of the early 1960s; here, too, the cycle of rising and then diminishing concentration is apparent.
The absence of national data prevents comparison with Ontario, though the provincial experience is telling of national trends. Ontario's rise in concentration during the 1960s and 1970s was followed, albeit less drastically, at the national scale, and represented the upper bounds of concentration for the industry within Canada. We can infer from the province's experience since the mid-1980s that concentration in Canadian housebuilding is no greater than in Ontario, given that the largest builders in the country are located there (CMHC, 1989, pages 16^17) . It is among the large builder class that we would expect to find the agents of concentration; a group of builders that could capture ever more market share as time passes. We know this has not happened. At the very least, we would expect the largest firms to be the most stable. But rather than persist and grow over time, even the largest housebuilders in Ontario öthe largest in Canada tooödiffer markedly from large industrials (table 6) : of the fifty largest builders in 1998, just four were present at all in 1978. Indeed, large builders were much less stable in the five years up to 1998 than large manufacturers were over thirty-five years. In terms of firm size classes, most of the fifty-seven`large' builders in 1998 were absent at each earlier five-year interval; of those present, they were as likely to be found in a smaller size class. This reinforces the point that mergers are unimportant in housebuilding and that their absence from the data does not skew the industry's firm size structure. Firm size changes reposition builders along the size distribution but do not alter market structure. More important, size appears to offer little in stability, and probably little in competitive advantage as well, thus maintaining a wide-ranging firm size distribution and deconcentration.
Conclusion
It is difficult to know how well Ontario continued to represent housebuilding in Canada into the 1990s, and how the Canadian and US experiences related. Ontario has approximated the Canadian average in the past, largely because of its sway over national trends. The largest builders in the country are located in Ontario, suggesting that the industry is probably less concentrated at the national scale than in the province. Should the industry vary from place to place, and with the US experience, this can only serve to reinforce the point that industries are not destined to adhere to a singular path of development, one ending with large dominating firms. Rather, each faces its own accumulation matrix in time and space. Why do the Canadian provinces display such divergent patterns in firm size structure? Could this be related to the growth of different metropolitan areas at different times, thus allowing large firms to reap the benefits of scale? Or does this just make room for more small builder entrants? The answers are unclear. What is more certain is that this census of builders is a starting point to understanding the structure and operations of housebuilding. For instance, it appeared that concentration in Ontario was on the rise into the 1980s, as Carroll rightly points out. Though not insignificant for consumers at the time, this trend was reversed by 1988 and the tide continues to run against larger builders in the 1990s. This study has shown that housebuilding in Ontario, and probably Canada too, has passed through a cycle of rising concentration into the 1970s, which then reversed beginning in the mid-1980s. More broadly, even when concentration peaked in housebuilding, it never approached the degree of centralisation so common in other industries. For this major political jurisdiction, then, this is an industry that contrasts sharply with the more familiar centralised activities in the industrial organisation literature. Few builders could sustain a high level of output sufficient for long-term growth and possible market dominance.
From the Ontario case, questions arise which relate directly to recent research in industrial geography and allied disciplines. Why have small firms survived in housebuilding? Is it because they are able to engage functional flexibility, perhaps allowing them to diversify into related construction activities when the market ebbs? This may be complemented by the apparent lack of advantages that come with increasing size, as large builders have not demonstrated an ability to further their market share advantage. Why have large firms not come to dominate the industry? Table 6 includes a category of firms labelled`withdrawn', suggestive of the possibility that builders may exercise some choice about the size of their operations and their presence. Perhaps the nature of construction work, largely undercapitalised and subcontracted, allows even large builders to dip in and out of new home construction, using their financial resources to`switch' between alternative market opportunities. And what of the role of production differentiation? Is the housing market fragmented such that different segments sustain alternative firm sizes? These too remain open questions, subject to theoretical speculation rather than empirical testing. The answers may prove that small builders are not necessarily markers of underdevelopment, but strategically sophisticated, or that large builders are not expansionary but satisficers. Whatever the case, these questions may only arise by first examining the industry's size structure.
